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Integral perspectives on happiness
A happiness science has emerged amidst, and spans, the social sciences. This research, de-spite the long philosophical tradition on happi-
ness, is in its infancy and a robust theory of happiness is 
called for. I will review parts of the literature and some 
of the main happiness theories using Ken Wilber’s Inte-
gral approach. I will concentrate largely on Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia, as that has re-emerged into the centre of 
happiness discussions as a possible contender for the 
prevailing subjective happiness theories. The Integral 
approach seems to provide valuable insights into many 
happiness theories, juxtapose them in a comprehen sible 
way, pinpoint deficiencies, and propose enhancements. 
Amongst other things, I will propose a new happi ness 
theory combining John Kekes’ happiness theory with 
ecological ethics and I will conclude that enlightenment 
proves to be a good candidate for the ultim ate good, or 
summum bonum, I will enlarge on Aristotle’s theory and 
propose that Wilber’s theory provides an ‘Integral road 
map towards eudaimonia enhanced, the enlightenment’. 
I will argue that eudaimonia and enlightenment, though 
superficially dissimilar, accord in surprising ways, to a 
great extent. I will discuss whether the discussion of 
happiness and morality is critically biased, and I will 
discuss the societal implications that Wilber’s concep-
tion of the human might have through its implications 
for happiness theories.
1. Introduction
There have been calls for a rigorous, philosophic al 
theory of happiness to shed light on the empiric al hap-
piness literature that has emerged lately in Western 
social sciences. ‘Philosophers … will find it unsurpris-
ing that if you rush to look for empiric al measures of 
an unanalyzed “subjective” phenomenon , the result 
will be confusion and banality’ (Annas 2008: 238). 
Wilber’s AQAL-model, spanning human experi ences 
and hundreds of thinkers from both East and West, is 
a noteworthy candidate for a theory on happiness, or, 
at least, something that should not be disregarded in 
the pursuit of knowledge on happiness. 
The implications of Ken Wilber’s Integral theory 
for the literature on happiness abound. In the follow-
ing I shall explore a few implications. I will mostly 
concentrate on Aristotle’s eudaimonia. The first sec-
tion here, however, discusses John Kekes’ (2008) 
theory of happiness. It is related to Aristotle’s happi-
ness, eudaimonia, in the sense that it also contains 
objective standards of happiness. By objective stand-
ards of happiness is meant here the conditions that 
have to be met for a happy life, regardless of what the 
person himself thinks.
Although over 2,000 years old, Aristotle’s theory 
on happiness, eudaimonia, has re-emerged at the 
centre of academic inquiry. It is at the centre of the 
new happiness sciences. These happiness sciences 
span more or less all of the social sciences. Happiness 
research has emerged, or re-emerged, at least, within 
psychology, economics, sociology, and philosophy. 
Recently, researchers have tried to operationalize 
eudaimonia and clarify it (see, e.g., Ryff and Singer 
2008, Ryan et al. 2008, OECD 2013). It is seen as a 
possible challenge to, or, at least, to be providing an 
additional perspective on happiness regarding the 
currently dominant Subjective Well-Being (SWB) 
approach. SWB is purely concerned with one’s sub-
jective experiences and assessments of one’s own life. 
More concretely, it relates to one’s satisfaction with 
life, to emotional well-being, or to a composite indi-
cator of the two (Diener 1984). So, eudaimonia can be 
seen as challenging the purely subjective happiness 
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approaches. It entails objective assessments of one’s 
happiness and requires a more rigorous theory 
behind it. 
Another novelty in psychology, and the social 
sciences in general, is the increasing tolerance of 
Buddhist conceptions of well-being and happiness. 
Buddhism seems to be making inroads into Western 
academia, not only as a topic of cultural or religious 
inquiry, but as a worthy source of knowledge on 
human well-being and happiness (see, e.g., Wallace 
and Shapiro 2006, Tomer 2011). After the first sec-
tion, I will enquire more deeply into eudaimonia and 
the Buddhist conception of happiness – enlighten-
ment – with the help of Wilber’s Integral approach.
2. The Integral view, Kekes, and environmental 
sustainability 
The distinction of four ‘quadrants’ or viewpoints on 
the universe and the human proves valuable in the 
discussion of happiness and in the conceptualization 
of happiness (Wilber 2009: Chapter 5). In what fol-
lows, I will at times reinterpret some parts of the Four 
Quadrants approach. When this is the case, I will give 
an explanation. 
Kekes (2008) discusses happiness at the indi-
vidual level. He states that a subjective satisfaction 
with life is a necessary condition for happiness, but 
not in itself sufficient. Subjective satisfaction with life 
belongs to the Upper-Left quadrant (ULQ).
Kekes proposes that an outsider may point to defi-
ciencies in the person’s assessment of his own life, in 
particular, with regard to the existence of a plausible 
‘life plan’. This involves an outsider’s judgement of 
another person’s subjective assessment of his own life. 
This seems to belong to the Upper-Right quadrant 
(URQ). Kekes proposes that the existence of such 
a life plan is another necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for happiness. He proposes that together 
these conditions, if met, are sufficient for happiness. 
So, Kekes actually claims that conditions from both 
upper quadrants are necessary for happiness. 
Note that here I possibly re-interpret Wilber’s 
idea of URQ: instead of understanding it in terms of 
behavioural psychology, I take it to include any out-
sider perspective on another person’s life, also pos-
sibly normative viewpoints.
However, Kekes does not highlight the societal 
aspect of happiness. Here, Wilber’s theory proves 
valuable because it highlights missing aspects. Kekes’ 
definition of a life plan is that it is a three-tiered 
structure of values that guide one’s actions and goals. 
He does not discuss, however, how the life plan, and 
its inherent values, are affected and influenced by 
the surrounding society, nor does he take any nor-
mative stance on what value contents and goal con-
tents are good. Nor does he adopt a consequentialist 
approach on what value contents and goal contents 
prove themselves best in terms of their consequences 
for happiness or a good life.
Here, I re-interpret Wilber’s theory of Four 
Quadrants. I conceptualize the Lower-Right quad-
rant (LRQ) to mean any outsider’s perspective on a 
society. I conceptualize LRQ not only to include the 
material and institutional structures of a society, as 
Wilber does, but also to include a normative stance 
on its values and customs. Re-interpreting the Four 
Quadrant approach, we may derive the following 
notions: 
•	 Society	influences	the	value	systems,	or	life	plans,	
of its members;
•	 Inspired	by	Wilber’s	LRQ,	we	may	scrutinize	the	
desirability of a society’s values and other struc-
tures, for example, its levels of usage of materials;
•	 Based,	for	example,	on	Kant	(2008) and deriv-
ing from his theory the duty to do to others as 
you would like to be done to yourself, we may 
scrutinize society’s values and structures from 
the point of view of the ecological limits of our 
globe. 
This all amounts to saying that, taking into 
account the limits of the Earth, a good life or a happy 
life cannot be one which involves values leading to 
consumption that exceeds a fair ecological footprint. 
Here, a fair ecological footprint means an ecological 
footprint that does not exceed the ecological limits 
of our globe while being generated equally by all 
humans. Also, it amounts to saying that a society 
which does not encourage ecologically desirable 
values and not actively opposing ecologically detri-
mental values cannot be a good or a happy society.
Note that this notion of a ‘happy’ society is based 
on the philosophical discussions on happiness that 
draw on Aristotle’s theory of a happy life. Aristotle 
says that a person might not know what a happy life 
is and that an outsider may judge one’s life as happy 
or not by objective standards. Here, what is new is 
the idea that an ethical or a normative approach may 
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be involved in the assessment of the standard of a 
happy life. For example, Kekes (2008) can be seen as 
relevant to this literature of an objective standard for 
the assessment of a happy life. I will return to this sec-
tion in the section ‘On happiness and morality’, after 
a fuller discussion of Wilber’s theory.
3. On happiness as enlightenment
On summum bonum and how to recognize it
If there can be found an element of human life, the 
satisfaction or fulfilment of which provides self-suffi-
cient, self-contained happiness, that is, it is alone suf-
ficient for happiness without the need for anything 
else and it is such that nothing is missing from one’s 
life, then, I argue, all would choose that over a happi-
ness that requires multiple elements to be sustained. 
All those who would not choose that, it seems, would 
be fools. This aspect on human life, which implies that 
a life lacks nothing, has been called finis ultimus or 
summum bonum in Western classical philosophic al 
writings on happiness.1
If there exists in life a finis ultimus or summum 
bonum towards which a life can be directed, it clearly 
is such that, when reached, all other things, all other 
possible ends in themselves, become secondary, non-
necessary, or are reached through attaining the finis 
ultimus. It is important to recognize that they are 
experienced as secondary only after the finis ultimus 
is attained or reached. Obviously, before reaching it, 
one cannot be sure that the proclaimed finis ultimus 
truly is such a finis ultimus or summum bonum. This 
would explain the variety of goals people have in 
their lives.
Enlightenment as summum bonum
Aristotle asks what is the essential property of a man? 
Just as a good screwdriver is a screwdriver that does 
its job well, a human living a good life is a human 
realizing and doing well what is essentially human. 
For Aristotle, the essential property of a man is reason 
and, thus, a good life must include the skilful use of 
reason. Aristotle lived within and was informed by 
his cultural sphere. Perhaps there are other spheres 
of human potential which were unknown to Ancient 
Greeks. Ken Wilber has amassed knowledge on 
human experience and potential from various cul-
1 Such a conception of the highest good can be found 
for example in Aristotle (2008).
tures while formulating his theories. Here, we may 
take Aristotle’s arguments about the good life as the 
realization of human potential and apply them in our 
search for knowledge about possible human potential 
through Ken Wilber’s works, informed by the world’s 
different cultures which were unnoticed in Ancient 
Greece.
One key aspect of human potential that can be 
extracted from Wilber’s works is the potential for the 
realization of the highest states of consciousness and 
the self. He refers to causal and nondualistic trad-
itions as containing knowledge of the highest states 
of consciousness and the self. Examples of causal 
trad itions are Theravada Buddhism and yoga schools 
based on Samkhya philosophy (Wilber 2009: 341) 
and examples of non-dualistic traditions are Vedanta 
Hinduism, Mahayana, and Vajrayana Buddhism 
(ibid. 342). 
Plato and Aristotle, or Philosophy. Lucca della Robbia, 
1437–9. Marble panel from the North side, lower basement 
of the bell tower of Florence, Italy. Museo dell’Opera del 
Duomo. 
Wikimedia Commons
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Wilber explains that in the causal traditions 
enlightenment is understood as a mental state 
wherein all ‘form’ disappears. Here ‘form’, it seems, 
refers to all experiences and understandings of the 
world as separate entities, such as a chair, me, you, 
this and that, while the enlightened state of mind is 
one of emptiness, lacking thoughts relating to separ-
ate entities. Instead, what is left is unity (Wilber 2009: 
Chapter 13).
By contrast, in non-dualistic traditions, it is under-
stood that unity, or emptiness, can be found from any 
form in this world. Thus, enlightenment is not a state 
of mind of emptiness; but instead, it is the ability to 
see emptiness, or unity, behind or in all form. Thus, 
as Wilber explains, enlightenment in these traditions 
is a continual process of realizing emptiness or unity 
in all form that is constantly remoulding itself into 
new forms (Wilber 2009: Chapter 13).
‘Buddhism promotes an ideal state of well-being 
that results from freeing the mind of its afflictive ten-
dencies and obscurations and from realizing one’s 
fullest potential in terms of wisdom, compassion, 
and creativity’ (Wallace and Shapiro 2006: 691). Also, 
Buddhism seems to promise some kinds of joy or 
positive feeling as well as freedom from suffering and 
fear.2 So, some kind of positive affect, positive feeling, 
and lack of negative affect, negative feeling, is prom-
ised, although, as discussed in later sections, it is not 
clear in what way this is to come about. It is suggested 
that enlightenment may include fearful thoughts 
while at the same time one is free from their hold.3
This suggests nearly all possible ends in them-
selves being contained in enlightenment. Many works 
on happiness based on Aristotle include a notion of 
the realization of a certain type of human potential 
or an individual’s personally specific potential as 
a necessary condition of happiness (see, e.g., Kraut 
2008, Taylor 2008). Aristotle (2008) argued that the 
exercise of reason coupled with emotions supporting 
the actions proposed by reason is a human potential 
the realization of which forms part of the happy life.4 
2 For example: ‘They who would escape the hundreds 
of life’s sorrows, who would end the anguish of 
living creatures, and who would taste hundreds of 
deep delights, must never surrender the Thought of 
Enlighten ment’ (Shantideva 1947: 38, 5–9).
3 See the section on ‘The holarchical view of happiness’ 
here. 
4 For a discussion of the meaning of virtue in Aristotle’s 
Greece see, e.g., Annas (2008).
Richard Taylor (2008) argued that happiness con-
sists in exercising creative intelligence. Hedonists, for 
example Epicurus (2008a, 2008b), Jeremy Bentham 
(2008), and John Stuart Mill (2008) along with 
Aristotle, argued that the attainment of pleasure, or 
positive feelings and emotions over negative feelings 
and emotions, is an end in itself and thus a possible 
condition of finis ultimus. Epicurus (2008a, 2008b), 
and Augustine (2008) argue that freedom from fear 
also is a necessary condition of happiness. This can be 
understood and agreed to easily without the ancient 
sages as well.
Thus, it seems that enlightenment might be a 
good candidate for a finis ultimus. It contains the 
realization of several different potentials inherent in 
humans and it can be argued that the development of 
consciousness and the realization of the highest states 
of consciousness are, in themselves, essential human 
capacities, or potentials -– essential in the sense that 
self-perceiving consciousness and reason are, accord-
ing to current knowledge, most highly developed in 
humans within the sphere of living beings known to 
date.
The holarchical view of happiness
If it is the case, as Wilber argues, that the develop-
ment of the consciousness and the self is a holarchy, 
which is to say that it proceeds through steps, each of 
which always contains the previous step, but is some-
thing more than the previous step, then, it is the case 
that the latest step is richer than the previous step. 
The new step contains more potential to experience 
things, more varied experiences, as well as new abil-
ities themselves. Now, it is easy to see that a person 
being content with a step that is not the highest step is 
foolish, since he can have the abilities and the experi-
ences of the step where he is, but also more. 
Ken Wilber argues that the highest level of the 
consciousness or the self is the step that introduces 
non-dualism, also known as enlightenment accord-
ing to some traditions.5 According to him, this level 
not only is free from the chains of pain, unsatisfied 
wants, objects, space and time itself; but it also con-
tains them. It is this condition to which the name 
‘non-dualistic’ also seems to refer. At the same time 
that one is free from pain, one still experiences it, for 
5 Examples of non-dualistic traditions are Vedanta 
Hinduism and Mahayana, and Vajrayana Buddhism 
(Wilber 2009: 342).
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example. As B. Allan Wallace and Shauna L. Shapiro 
note, the type of happiness promoted by Buddhism 
…is not a matter of choosing well-being instead 
of hedonic pleasures, some of which, like the 
joys of friendship and worthwhile accomplish-
ments, may be very meaningful. The enjoyment 
of such transient experiences is not in opposi-
tion to the cultivation of positive attitudes and 
commitments or the cultivation of the types 
of mental balance that yield inner well-being 
(Wallace and Shapiro 2006: 692).
 Thus, we see that this final step seems to, indeed, 
contain all previous steps, and include more than the 
previous steps and so if enlightenment truly is what 
Wilber, along with the various traditions, claims and 
the development of the mind truly is a holarchy, the 
person not striving for enlightenment is foolish.
4. The Integral road map to eudaimonia enhanced, 
enlightenment
Let us focus next on the fundamental conceptions 
of the human mind that the two authors, Aristotle 
and Wilber, have, in order to juxtapose their theories 
more effectively. Any theory of happiness must be 
based on an implicit or an explicit conception of the 
human. Those things which a theory acknowledges 
as being part of the human mind define and limit the 
possible conceptions of happiness the theory may 
present.
Aristotle described the domain of the soul as 
one which contains passions, faculties, and states of 
character. The passions are, for example, ‘appetite, 
anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, 
hatred, longing, … and in general the feelings that are 
accompanied by pleasure or pain’. Faculties are ‘the 
things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of 
feeling’ passions. States of character are ‘the things in 
virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference 
to the passions, e.g., with reference to anger we stand 
badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if 
we feel it moderately’ (Aristotle 2008: 25). 
Thus, we can interpret that those states of charac-
ter are unconscious, non-phenomenological mental 
structures which determine the emotions and desires 
as well as their appearance and strength.
Aristotle sees virtues to be the crux of a happy life 
and of the development towards the happy life. He 
identifies that virtues are states of character. Those 
elem ents, as discussed before, are reason and emotion, 
or intellect and morality. They dispose the individual 
to feel appropriately and to be capable of wise reason-
ing. On the reason element of virtue Aristotle (2008) 
states that ‘intellectual virtue in the main owes both 
its birth, and its growth to teaching (for which reason 
it requires experience and time)’ (p. 23). Referring to 
emotion or the element of morality, Aristotle states: 
‘It makes no small difference, then, whether we form 
habits of one kind or another from our very youth; 
it makes a very great difference, or rather all the dif-
ference’ (Aristotle 2008: 24). So, Aristotle saw virtues 
to be the crux of a happy life. Because virtues are 
states of character which seem to actually be uncon-
scious, mental structures that determine the flow of 
our experience, this can be interpreted as saying that 
Aristotle saw those unconscious, mental structures to 
be the crux of a happy life.
Interestingly, Wilber also identifies non-phenom-
enological, unconscious structures of the mind as 
the crux of human development and life (and of the 
universe in general, with the human as the last link). 
‘[W]ithin the broad states of consciousness, there 
exist various structures of consciousness … within 
which there exist various states of mind’ (Wilber 
Happy Union, Allegory of Love, IV. Paolo Veronese, circa 
1575. National Gallery. 
Wikimedia Commons
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2000: 287n14.21) The broad states of consciousness 
are waking, dreaming, and deep sleep (ibid. 1). The 
structures of consciousness are the aforementioned 
holarchical steps of development of consciousness 
which consist of developmental lines and the self 
(ibid. 5–12, chapters 2–4). From now on, I will not 
mention the more detailed structures of the develop-
mental steps as they are not required for the argu-
ments I am making. However, it should be noted that 
Wilber conceptualizes the holarchical steps of devel-
opment as consisting of developmental lines and that 
he conceptualizes the self as a ‘navigator’ of the steps 
and the developmental lines (ibid. Chapter 3) The 
states of mind refer to ‘phenomenal states’ which can 
be directly experienced. These are, for example, ‘joy, 
happiness, sadness, desire’ (Wilber 2006: 13) and ‘joy, 
doubt, determination’ (Wilber 2000: 287n14.21).
It seems that Aristotle approached what Wilber 
conceptualizes today. Both Wilber and Aristotle 
identify that the crux of life and development lies 
in mental structures that unconsciously determine 
the flow of phenomenological experience; both the 
thoughts, reason, and the passions, feelings, impulses, 
and emotions. The 
…structures [the holarchical developmental 
steps]6 do indeed constrain and implicitly mold 
all of the states of mind that occur within them 
(e.g., a person at concrete operational thinking 
will have most of his thoughts – and states of 
mind – arise within that structure… . (Wilber 
2000: 287n14.21)
Thus, it appears that, while Wilber accords with 
Aristotle on the crux of life and development as those 
things which unconsciously form the stream of phe-
nomenological experience, Wilber fills out, gives fur-
ther structure, and additional content to Aristotle’s 
conception. Wilber, deriving concepts from contem-
porary Western psychology, philosophy, science, and 
ancient wisdom traditions, structures the uncon-
scious, non-phenomenological side of conscious-
ness which is the crux of Aristotle’s happy life as well. 
Interestingly, it can be said that Wilber’s theory com-
bines Aristotle’s ideas of the good life with contem-
6 Wilber uses ‘structure’, ‘wave’, and ‘level’ interchange-
ably to denote the unconscious, holarchical devel-
opmental steps of the self or consciousness (Wilber 
2000: 7). I will denote them as ‘steps’ of the self.
porary developmental psychology (amongst other 
things). 
What additions does Wilber’s theory bring to 
Aristotle’s conceptions? Wilber’s proposal adds 
for example, the self, lines of development, the 
holarchic al nature of development, broad states of 
consciousness, peak experiences, altered states of 
consciousness, and the ideas of enlightenment from 
the Eastern and Western wisdom and religious trad-
itions. Also, Wilber’s theory contains the idea that at 
each broad level of development the individual has a 
different worldview, set of morals, sense of self and 
identity, and sense of what is good (Wilber 2009: 
224; Wilber 2000: 46). Related to this, interestingly, 
he suggests that each level of consciousness has a dif-
ferent epistemological ‘eye’ which can see different 
planes of the world, each of which are ontologically 
true (Wilber 2000: 236n8.2).
What does the structure added to Aristotle’s con-
ception of man imply to his idea of the development 
of man towards a good life? Aristotle’s conception of 
human development seems to be closely related to 
the nurture-nature dichotomy. He thinks that moral 
development is merely a process of forming a habit 
and that of the intellect is but a matter of teaching 
(Aristotle 2008: 23, 24). He seems to come close to 
the conception of a man as a slate which is blank 
until culture, virtues and intellect are painted onto 
it.7 It can be seen that this conception of develop-
ment misses culture-independent states of develop-
ment, culture-independent transition processes over 
the states of development, and culture-independent 
directions of development, which are at the centre of 
Wilber’s theory.8
7 Although Aristotle’s conception of man and his 
development seems to come close to the concep-
tion of man as a blank slate and the nurture-nature 
dichotomy, his theory of happiness has been used 
as a basis for universal ethical theories. See, e.g., 
Nussbaum (1988). Also, as discussed later, when 
examining closely his fundamental conception of the 
mind, we may see that it allows for theories beyond 
the nurture-nature dichotomy.
8 Note that Wilber’s theory contains both culture- 
dependent and culture-independent, universal fea-
tures and so it does not claim the obviously untenable 
proposition that there are no cultural differences 
in states or development processes (Wilber 2000: 
221n1.7).
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All in all, it seems that Aristotle identified that the 
crux of human development towards happi ness lies 
in unconscious mental structures. Wilber, amassing 
knowledge from the West and the East, tries to expose 
and detail these unconscious mental structures. 
Combining Wilber’s theory with that of Aristotle, we 
seem to get a modified version of Aristotle’s theory: 
the highest level of virtue is enlightenment and, in 
order to reach the highest level of virtue, one needs to 
proceed through the holarchical, partly culture-inde-
pendent developmental steps of consciousness in 
Wilber’s work. So, it can be said that Wilber’s Integral 
theory provides a detailed road map to eudaimonia 
enchanced, enlightenment. If Wilber got it right, it 
seems that the Aristotle’s archer (Aristotle 2008: 
19), aiming at happiness, should set as his target the 
unconscious developmental steps and structures of 
the mind outlined in Wilber’s works.
5. Eudaimonia versus enlightenment
Although Aristotle’s and Wilber’s Buddhism-inspired 
ideas seem to cohere well together, there appear to be 
striking differences. Aristotle’s conception of a happy 
life is often seen to be one of social engagement and it 
is often seen to be judged by objective standards and 
not to concern subjective experience. By contrast, 
the Buddhist idea of the highest good, enlighten-
ment, is thought to be characterized by freedom from 
social engagements and to be inherently a subjective 
realization.
Again, Wilber’s Integral approach seems to be 
of use in discussing this apparent clash. In terms of 
Wilber’s quadrants, the problem restated seems to 
be as follows: Aristotle’s conception of a happy life 
belongs to the URQ and the LLQ, the third-person 
view and the interpersonal, moral dimension. It 
is seen not to involve components in the ULQ, the 
subjective sphere. The state of enlightenment, on the 
other hand, seems to belong purely in the ULQ, the 
subjective sphere with an explicitly stated detach-
ment from social engagements (LLQ).9 So, Aristotle’s 
conception concerns ULQ and LLQ, and enlighten-
ment concerns ULQ. 
9 For example, the following quotation seems to state 
freedom from social engagements: ‘As soon as one 
undertakes to free himself from the unbounded 
realms of living beings, he concentrates his mind with 
steadfast thought’ (Shantideva 1947).
In the following, I will juxtapose the theories one 
quadrant at a time. Are there differences in the sub-
jective spheres of the two happiness conceptions? 
There have been claims that Aristotle’s theory is not 
only a third-person view on an evaluative account 
of happiness, but also includes subjective satisfac-
tion with life (ULQ) (Kraut 2008). Thus, both the 
Aristotelian conception and the Buddhist concep-
tion involve a subjective component (ULQ). He ‘who 
attains Eudaimonia is necessarily happy with his life. 
His deepest desires are being satisfied, and realizing 
this, he has an especially affirmative attitude towards 
himself and his life’ (Kraut 2008: 204). As discussed in 
the earlier sections, enlightenment seems to be such a 
state that all goals are indeed satisfied. The quality of 
the subjective experiences in these final states of the 
two traditions are likely to be different; but both do 
contain the subjective component and both entail the 
experience of  satisfaction with one’s life.10
How about the interpersonal, moral dimen-
sion (LLQ)? The final stages of the Mahayana path 
are described as including impartial, global com-
passion. When contrasted with Aristotle’s theory, it 
seems that, the most visible difference is the ‘moral 
span’ (Wilber 2000: 116), the scope of those who are 
‘deemed worthy of being included in the decision in 
the first place’ (ibid. 116). Aristotle (2008) explicitly 
defines the good life to be such that it is good, not 
only for the individual, but also for ‘parents, chil-
dren, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow 
citizens, since man is born for citizenship’ (p. 21). 
Thus the moral span of the happy man in Aristotle’s 
theory seems to be his city state. Where Mahayana 
happiness entails impartial compassion for all beings, 
Aristotle’s happiness entails moral conduct to fellow 
citizens. So, both theories contain components in the 
interpersonal domain (LLQ), but the moral span is 
different.
The condition of enlightenment is also said to be a 
state of mind which is free of any attachments, includ-
ing social ones. Aristotle’s is said to be one which is 
intrinsically about social bonds. Is there a contradic-
tion here, ultimately? The answer seems to be no. 
The Mahayana enlightenment is claimed to be free 
10 Then again, it is not clear what satisfaction means 
in a nondual state which seems to merge opposites, 
amidst all other things, into one. Thus, satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction are the same? (Wilber 2009: chap-
ter 13)
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of attachments while apparently including impartial 
compassion. This seems to mean that the individual is 
free of attachments, but as a consequence of compas-
sion, voluntarily acts for the benefit of all beings. The 
key here seems to be voluntary choice. Scrutinizing 
Aristotle’s conception, we find that it also requires 
voluntary choice. ‘The agent must be in a certain 
condition when he does them [virtuous acts]; in the 
first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must 
choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, 
and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character’ (Aristotle 2008: 25).11 So, 
the moral conduct in both of the conceptions of hap-
piness is based on voluntary, autonomous choice. By 
autonomous, I mean voluntary, ‘reflective endorse-
ment of one’s actions’ (Ryan et al. 2008: 157).
Additionally, not only are the moral actions of 
the two traditions voluntarily endorsed, but they 
11 See Ryan et al. (2008) for an extensive discussion on 
the issue.
are driven by ‘a firm and unchangeable charac-
ter’ (Aristotle 2008: 25). Enlightenment is, at least 
according to Wilber and the Mahayana, seen to be 
a stable level of development, that is, an enlightened 
person also has a ‘firm and unchangeable character’ 
of being enlightened. And this points to the similar-
ity in the final quadrant discussed, the URQ, for in 
Buddhism either it is not enough for the person to say 
he is happy; he must be enlightened to be happy. This 
is an objective assessment (URQ). Also, many trad-
itions have a custom of assessing the level of develop-
ment of any given person by a group of experts, that 
is, from a third-person point of view, objectively. This 
echoes the objective evaluation nature of Aristotle’s 
theory. 
Although eudaimonia and enlightenment seem 
contradictory in important ways at first, they appear 
to be very alike after a more careful scrutiny using the 
Integral perspective. It is not the case that eudaimonia 
is purely an objective assessment of one’s happi-
ness (URQ) in terms of one’s excellence in fulfilling 
social engagements and societal norms (LLQ) where 
Buddha, resisting the demons of Mara, who are attempting to prevent him from attaining enlightenment, as the angels 
watch from above. Lithograph, 1800–1900. 
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enlightenment is purely a subjective experience 
(ULQ) without social concerns (no LLQ). Rather, 
it seems that both contain components in each 
quadrant and both are based on voluntary, autono-
mous moral action driven by a ‘firm and unchange-
able character’. It actually appears to be the case that 
Aristotle’s theory fits well into Wilber’s framework: it 
seems to arise from a lower level of development than 
enlightenment (which is the highest level).12 
All in all, looking at the differences of eudaimonia 
and enlightenment using Wilber’s All-Quadrant, 
All-Level (AQAL) approach, we seem to be left with 
the conclusion that eudaimonia is a concept of good 
that arises from a lower level of development than 
enlightenment; otherwise, they are alike.
6. On happiness and morality
The first section here discussed Kekes’ theory of 
happiness with the help of Wilber’s Four Quadrant 
approach and presented the view that happiness 
theories can be combined with an extended objective 
valuation of an individual’s life as well as the norms of 
a society in total. It combined a societal perspective 
with the individual-focused theories of happiness. 
We return to this issue on the subject of happiness 
12 Interestingly, the Integral re-interpretation of 
eudaimonia also nicely clarifies the discussion on 
whether Aristotle’s theory is only an objective, evalu-
ative account of happiness (Haybron 2008: 174) or 
whether it is also a subjective account of happiness 
(Kraut 2008). Simply put, the objective measures 
relate to the unconscious structures, the holarchical 
steps of human development, which manifest them-
selves in all of the quadrants (I will not discuss the 
LRQ here): the subjective, the behavioural, and the 
moral. It would be interesting to see where Aristotle 
would fit in Wilber’s developmental states. Aristotle 
(2008) discusses the virtues in the context of how 
different actions or states of character are seen and 
appreciated amongst the people of his culture (p. 
23–30, or Book II). Wilber’s theory contains the idea 
that at each broad level of development the individual 
has a different worldview, morals, sense of self and 
identity, and a sense of what is good (Wilber 2009: 
224; Wilber 2000: 46). On the other hand, he highly 
esteems reason as the inherent potential of a human 
being, and the emotions are subjected under the rule 
of reason. Thus, it seems that Aristotle sees the world 
from somewhere around ‘role’ and ‘formal’ broad 
levels of development (Wilber 2000: 197c1A). Wilber 
links nation states to the formal levels (ibid. 2, 3).
and morality. Here, the first section on Kekes and 
the latter sections on enlightenment and Aristotle’s 
happi ness based on virtuous, moral living come 
together.
This combination of ecological ethics and one’s 
happiness may seem frivolous: why would a happy 
man care about the views of others on his life which 
he experiences as and judges to be good? If there is 
no relation between the subjective states of mind and 
subjective judgements of a man and the ethical and 
normative views presented here, can it be said that 
those views are required for a happy life? 
There is a long-standing debate between how 
one should live one’s life from the point of view of a 
good life: should one live morally, or eudaimonistic-
ally, or should one live hedonically?13 Wilber’s con-
ceptualization, if true, seems to clarify the debate. 
Phenomenal experiences such as pain, joy, thoughts, 
and morals, are all guided by unconscious mental 
structures. Different levels of development entail dif-
ferent phenomenal experiences as well as different 
morals. Higher developmental steps entail a more 
satisfactory life. The implication of this seems to be 
that concentration on hedonia, pleasure and pain in 
one’s life might inhibit one’s advancement to higher 
levels of morality and thus one’s overall development. 
This, in turn, according to the theory, would lead to 
suboptimal hedonic or subjective experience as well. 
So, the case would appear to be the following: the 
‘happy immoralist’ (Cahn and Murphy 2008: 262) 
thinks he is happy, but he would be happier were he 
on a higher developmental step. 
But that sounds rather baseless; what does it mean 
to say that a person is on a higher developmental step? 
The moral span of a person is related to the notion of 
developmental steps (Wilber 2000: 116). The people 
on the highest, transpersonal steps of development 
identify not only with the form we commonly recog-
nize as an individual human being but instead with 
a greater group of beings (Wilber 2011). Thus, ‘his’ 
well-being seems to be inseparably linked with ‘other 
beings’. Therefore, for such a person, the points made 
by, for example, Christine Vitrano (2008) are mean-
ingless. They are based on a different identification 
of the self, that is, on a different developmental step. 
If it is the case then that developmental steps are in 
13 See, e.g., Plato (2008), Aristotle (2008), Butler (2008), 
Sidgwick (2008), Cahn and Murphy (2008), and 
Vitrano (2008).
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some sense real and that higher developmental steps 
entail higher phenomenal quality as well, the ‘happy 
immoralist’ truly has not attained the best possible 
happiness.
Therefore, if Wilber’s theory has truth in it, it 
seems that a lot of the discussion on how happi-
ness and morality interact is biased. It is based on an 
incomplete understanding of the human being, that 
is, it misses the developmental aspect of the human 
consciousness which Wilber highlights. 
A troubling implication seems to also be that the 
discussion of happiness and morality is conducted 
by individuals who are not themselves on the high-
est step of development, but who then criticize the 
claims made by people possibly on higher develop-
mental levels who have tried to verbalize the import-
ance of morality on the path towards true well-being 
– that is, the advancement towards enlightenment 
and the highest good available.
Wilber’s idea of a holarchical development of the 
The Four quadrants in Ken Wilber’s Integral Theory. The ladders in each quadrant represent the holarchical developmen-
tal steps, development being movement away from the center towards the corners. According to Wilber, the develop-
mental steps manifest themselves in each quadrant simultaneously. Thus, for example, the 10th step actualizes in each 
quadrant simultaneously. Although any culture contains individuals being in different developmental states, the majority 
of them in this example would hover around the 10th developmental step.
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self provides a new viewpoint also on the empiric al 
results on the superiority of the eudaimonic 
lifestyle,14 related to the aforementioned theoretical 
debate on the relation between happiness and moral-
ity: what are the exact sources of the superior well-
being outcomes? Is it the eudaimonic actions them-
selves, as seems to be often assumed in this literature, 
or is there a component related to the steps of the 
development of the self themselves or some other 
aspect of those states that creates the additional well-
being outcomes? For example, Wallace and Shapiro 
(2006: 693–4) state that the basis of the Buddhist 
theory of well-being is that true well-being relates to 
the state of mind which pertains before sensory or 
conceptual stimulation. Thus the state of mind that is 
the developmental step of consciousness, itself deter-
mines well-being, not the external stimuli such as life 
conditions or the realized actions themselves. 
On the other hand, the aforementioned idea that 
true well-being relates to the state of mind before 
sensory or conceptual stimulation, might yield an 
empirical tool for assessing the validity of Wilber’s 
model presented in this article as well. Are the devel-
opmental steps something more than just concepts 
superimposed by Wilber on the human mind; in 
other words, are they something real? If the people 
on higher developmental steps were to rate their 
well-being, following the question ‘Imagine all of the 
external supports for your present sense of happi-
ness and security suddenly disappearing. What sense 
of well-being remains?’ (Wallace and Shapiro 2006: 
699), more highly than those on lower developmen-
tal steps, this would suggest that the developmental 
steps truly are something existent and relevant.15 
This, then, would have powerful implications for 
the theoretical literature on happiness (for example, 
the debate on the relationships between happiness 
and morality), as well as the contemporary societal 
structures of our nations, as discussed in the follow-
ing section. It would also imply the importance of 
long-term moral development for the benefit of the 
individuals as well as the societies.
14 See, e.g., Steger et al. (2008), McMahan and Estes 
(2011), Peterson et al. (2005), Park et al. (2009), Ryan 
and Deci (2001), and Waterman (1993).
15 For a discussion on the validity of Wilber’s concep-
tualization of the mental structures see, for example, 
Karhu in this publication.
7. The Integral view on the conception of the human 
and well-being
In the following, I will briefly discuss how Wilber’s 
and Aristotle’s conceptions of the human position 
them in the contemporary social sciences and what 
are the possible implications of their ideas for the 
social sciences and society.
The value-relativist, culture-relativist, and extreme 
constructivist conceptions of human life have been 
questioned lately. I will denote anything opposing 
the extreme value-relativist and culture-relativist 
conceptions of man as simply non-relativist and any-
thing embracing those ideas as relativist. Theories 
that challenge relativist conceptions of human life 
also bear on the question of happiness and well-being 
and have a potential for radical changes in our con-
ceptions of the good life and, thus, the contemporary 
societal structures that are supported by the relativist 
conceptions of human life. 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1992) identify 
and describe the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ 
(SSSM) of humanity that has reigned in the social sci-
ences. It is a ‘set of assumptions and inferences about 
humans, their minds, and their collective interaction 
… that has provided the conceptual foundations of 
the social sciences for nearly a century’ (ibid. 23). 
They claim that a new, better model does not treat the 
human being as a blank slate in accordance with the 
nurture and nature dichotomy; but instead under-
stands also that human development involves both 
nurture and nature components inseparably inter-
twined (ibid. 24, 49–50). They provide guidelines for 
such a better conceptualization of man and name it 
the ‘Integrated Causal Model’ (ICM) (ibid. 24).
Theories challenging the value-relativist concep-
tions of man have a potential for greatly revolution-
izing our academic theories as well as those societal 
structures that are supported by the old theories. One 
example of this is economics. Many of the contempor-
ary societal structures and aims – for example the 
gross domestic product as the aim of development, 
and free markets as the key to development – are sup-
ported by the SSSM-type theories. It seems that SSSM-
type theories have also enabled economics to become 
such a powerful science in terms of how influential 
it is in the contemporary world. This is because the 
conception of well-being in contempor ary economic 
theory is largely based on unconditional preference 
satisfaction. Thus, whatever your preferences are, as 
long as you get them satisfied, you are happy. Such 
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a view requires value relativism. This, then, leads to 
the conclusion that, the more resources one has, the 
more one can satisfy those preferences. And it seems 
that markets have been very powerful in yielding us 
resources. Now, a theory saying that the content of 
preferences matters may change drastic ally the way 
we think about issues in today’s world.
Although Aristotle’s conception of development 
of man seems to be closely allied to the nurture-
nature dichotomy, careful scrutiny of his writings 
suggests that his conception of man might have been 
open to more non-relativist ideas on the develop-
ment of man. ‘Neither by nature … nor contrary 
to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are 
adapted by nature to receive them, and are made per-
fect by habit’ (Aristotle 2008: 23). So, it seems, that 
his theory is open to the view that, not only does 
nature lay the foundations on which nurture builds 
the virtues, but also that nature directs the ways in 
which nurture works and can work. As shown earlier, 
the two theories can be combined so that Wilber fills 
out Aristotle’s theory with new advances in Western 
sciences as well as applying knowledge from ancient 
traditions of wisdom such as Buddhism.
Wilber discusses how subjective reality – that 
which according to extreme constructivists is fully 
malleable – and the objective realities are related in 
perception: ‘Even Wilfrid Sellars … maintains that, 
even though the manifest image of an object is in 
part a mental construction, it is guided in import-
ant ways by intrinsic features of sense experience’ 
(Wilber 2000: 163). But perception is clearly already 
an important building block in the development of 
the mind. Moreover, the holarchical developmental 
steps, developmental lines and so forth are nothing 
other than intrinsic, developmental features of the 
human mind.
Another example of a new theory that contrasts 
with SSSM is Edward Ryan and Richard Deci’s Self-
Determination Theory (SDT)16 in psychology. It pro-
vides ample empirical evidence against the relative 
social science theories. It shows that well-being truly 
is such that the content of the preferences themselves 
matter. In other words, the goals in one’s life matter 
for well-being, not only the extent to which they are 
accomplished.
16 For a good overview, see Ryan and Deci (2000).
Interestingly, Wilber’s theory and SDT seem to be 
complementary.17 I will discuss this very briefly. SDT 
leaves the exact structures of the development of con-
sciousness and the human being open and, instead, 
focus on the role of the interplay between the indi-
vidual and the environment in the progression of the 
life path. SDT highlights the environmental factors 
supporting personal growth while Wilber’s model 
proposes the mental structures of development 
ranging from prenatal states to ego development to 
enlightenment and yields a map of possible points 
of intervention and the tools for those interventions 
which support development. So it might be that SDT 
provides Wilber’s model with those conditions of 
the environment that are required and support pro-
gression through the levels of development, while 
Wilber’s model lays out the intrinsic developmental 
structures of the mind.
All three theories, Aristotle’s, Wilber’s, and Deci 
and Ryan’s, thus point towards non-relativistic con-
ceptions of the human being which challenge the old 
conceptions which still underlie many social science 
theories and contemporary societal structures and 
aims.
8. Concluding remarks
I proposed a new happiness theory combining nor-
mative judgements, particularly on ecological sus-
tainability, and Kekes’ theory: an individual or a soci-
ety cannot be deemed happy if they exceed their fair 
share in ecological destruction and pollution. I then 
clarified the concept of the ultimate good, summum 
bonum, and discussed the possibility of enlighten-
ment as a good candidate for summum bonum, based 
on both Aristotle and Ken Wilber’s theories. Section 
4 proposed a novel combination of Aristotle’s and 
Wilber’s works and claimed that Wilber’s theory fills 
gaps in Aristotle’s understanding of the human being. 
Aristotle’s archer aiming for happiness should set as 
his target the unconscious mental structures out-
lined in Wilber’s theory. Section 5 discussed appar-
ent conflicts between Aristotelian eudaimonia and 
Buddhist enlightenment and claimed that they are 
only apparent and do not withstand deeper scrutiny. 
17 Which might not be that surprising given that they 
are both about human development and thus build 
on, amidst other things, Western developmental 
psychology.
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The All-Quadrant, All-Level approach suggests that 
the two theories match, the only difference being 
that eudaimonia is a lower-level concept of happi-
ness than enlightenment. Section 6 returned to my 
combination of Kekes with ecological ethics and 
discussed the implications of the Integral approach 
on the long-standing discussion of happiness and 
morality. It concluded that the discussions of happi-
ness and morality are based on an incomplete picture 
of the human being and are, thus, biased. Section 7 
discussed Aristotle’s and Wilber’s conceptions of the 
human being and positioned them with respect to the 
contemporary social sciences. It suggested that they 
belong to a new wave of theories that challenge the 
old, value-relativist conceptions of the human being. 
If Wilber’s theory is correct, it would raise contro-
versial implications for theories of happiness. These 
implications range from Aristotle’s eudaimonia being 
merely included in a more holistic theory of happi-
ness – the Integral Theory, to questions of happiness 
and morality being based on an incomplete concep-
tion of the human being. As explained in section 7 
more generally, Wilber’s theory and its implications 
for happiness possess the potential for serious impli-
cations for the social sciences and for our societal 
structures. 
Section 6 outlined a possible means of empirically 
examining the validity of the developmental steps, 
thus outlining a possible future research direction. 
If answers to the question ‘Imagine all of the exter-
nal supports for your present sense of happiness and 
security suddenly disappearing. What sense of well-
being remains?’ (Wallace and Shapiro 2006: 699) is 
found to correlate with other indicators related to 
developmental steps, it would provide evidence in 
support of the validity of Wilber’s conceptualizations 
of the developmental structures of the mind. 
Wilber’s theory seems to detail various happi-
ness theories, yield a relatively rigorous framework 
en abling the juxtaposition of different happiness 
theor ies in an comprehensible manner, point to 
the deficiencies a given happiness theory has, and 
propose enhancements to the theories. Given its 
explana tory power, it seems, that Wilber’s Integral 
Theory deserves attention with regards to happiness 
and the social sciences in general. 
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